Patrick Pearse’s Legacy

I recall that when I was twelve years old in sixth class, I asked my teacher, Owen O’Sullivan, why Patrick Pearse was not canonized by the Catholic Church. I pointed out that he was a brave idealist who died as a martyr for his country. In addition, Pearse was a devout Catholic who drew his inspiration from Christ, who also died to save his people. What more, I wondered, did the man have to do to have his exemplary sanctity recognized by Rome?

Today, I view Pearse and his 1916 rebellion very differently. After the military debacle that is called “The Easter Rising,” the poet William Butler Yeats commented very presciently about the uprising in one of his poems when he wrote that “A Terrible Beauty is Born!” He correctly foresaw that Pearse’s blood sacrifice would motivate many idealistic young men and women to kill and be killed in the name of the idealized republic declared at the GPO.

Pearse had no popular mandate for his revolution. He was told by Eoin McNeill, his commander in the Irish Volunteers, not to go ahead with his plans for an armed uprising. However, he felt that he and his comrades were following a higher philosophy, striking a blow for Ireland that they hoped would raise the spirit of the people, who would then rebel and revolt en masse against the British.

Now, democratic principles were well established in Ireland by the beginning of the 20th century. By the end of the previous millenium, Daniel O’Connell and, especially, Charles Parnell, had achieved major political progress for Ireland in Westminster. They were able to move forward by using various astute parliamentary tactics in the London parliament and by maintaining a strong support base in successive elections throughout most of Ireland.

Agitation for land reform was central to the nationalist political agenda in the 19th century. Under Parnell, who was wholeheartedly supported by Michael Davitt, the dynamic leader of the Land League, major political progress was made in this area. In fact, after the passage of a number of reforms in Westminster, culminating with the Wyndham Act in 1903, nearly all the changes sought by Davitt were achieved. It should be stressed that these important reforms were achieved without resorting to violence.

The repeal of the Act of Union of 1801 was the other major goal of O’Connell and later, Parnell. The Irish Parliamentary Party used their power very astutely in Westminster to press their case for a Home Rule bill that would return political power to a Dublin parliament. Finally, they were successful, prior to the start of the First World War, but the government in Westminster postponed implementing the Irish Home Rule Bill until, what they called,the Great War was over.

The agitation for Home Rule was supported by nearly all Irish nationalists, including Patrick Pearse and the IRB. A parliament in Dublin, with limited power, was never seen as a final solution by Irish nationalists of any hue; rather, it was viewed as offering a major step towards full independence – what Michael Collins memorably called in the later Treaty debate “the freedom to achieve freedom.”



Protestants, who were very strong numerically in the province of Ulster, formed the Ulster Volunteers, whose sole objective was to reject any allegiance to a Dublin parliament. In their eyes Home Rule would be Rome Rule, and they would die to prevent that. So, Westminster moved reluctantly to set up two parliaments in Ireland, one in Dublin and one in Belfast.

Ironically, Pearse praised the determination and stubbornness of the Ulster loyalists for resisting by threatened force the imposition of the preferred British solution, one parliament in Dublin for the whole island. And, it should be noted that even the most extreme Republicans, including Pearse, never advocated imposing a united Ireland of any kind by confronting the Ulster Volunteers by force.

The events of Easter 1916 changed the dynamics of Irish politics. The executions by the British of so many brave and idealistic Irishmen after the Rising were largely responsible for swinging the country away from the Irish Parliamentary Party and into supporting the Sinn Fein Party, which did very well in the 1918 election.

I often wonder what would have happened if Pearse had obeyed McNeill’s command and called off the insurrection. It is very likely that Home Rule would have been implemented and that this, over time, with the demise of imperialism throughout the world, would have led to more and more freedom, ending up, almost inevitably, with the full measure which evolved in the South of Ireland about thirty years after Pearse’s death.

Surely, this scenario would have been preferable to the divisions, the killings and the mayhem that dominated Irish political history in the 20th century. The parliamentary approach, the constitutional road, that was followed so successfully in the 19th century could have served Ireland very well in the 20th century also. Was the birthing of Pearse’s “Terrible Beauty” in 1916 worth it?

AFGHANISTAN

Readers of my blogs know that I am an avid supporter of President Obama. He has inherited an awful mess from his predecessor, whose presidency I view as a total disaster for America. Worst of all, he seemed to lack any ability to assess the serious consequences of his decisions. So, he justified his invasion of Iraq in a different way every week, and he blithely dismissed concerns about the huge budget deficit that his policies caused.

By comparison, watching President Obama explain and implement his policies is like a breath of fresh air in the body politic. The Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, who is a holdover from the Bush Administration, explained over the weekend that while his previous boss showed little interest in detailed analysis before making a decision, the much more serious Obama approach invites in-depth assessment from all sides before he makes policy calls.

In this context, I am puzzled by the President’s approach to Afghanistan. He announced that he was making good on his campaign promise by committing an additional 17,000 troops to Afghanistan. At the same time, he has appointed a top team of military and diplomatic experts to come up with the best strategic policies that America should pursue in that region.

Mr. Obama stated a few days ago that he will make strategic decisions for the future after he receives the recommendations from this high-powered, important group. Why announce the movement of American forces in advance of their report? This unfortunate commitment of so many new troops only makes sense in terms of an increasing military commitment in Afghanistan.

What are the goals of the United States-led NATO presence in Afghanistan? We know that America’s number one enemy, Osama Bin Laden, is hiding somewhere in the vast mountain areas that span the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Special forces from the United States and its allies have been on an unsuccessful mission to find him for the last eight years, mainly because the terrain, mostly mountains and caves, is very inhospitable to Western troops. And, the people in the villages, who may know where he is, will not talk because of a combination of an historical hatred of Western invaders and a fear of harsh reprisal by Taliban or tribal leaders.

The Taliban were successfully ousted from power by Western forces, but they have gradually reasserted their authority over most of the country, outside of Kabul. The central government seems unable to establish its control, even with the help of US and other NATO forces.

American leaders are also very concerned about the huge supply of poppy, the basic source of opium and its derivative, heroin, that is grown in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Taliban, who derive most of their funds from the drug trade, have instructed the local farmers to expand their production of this profitable crop. And, there was a big increase in the poppy supply from the region in 2008.

The Taliban are fully supported by Al Qaeda forces in their war against the West. Bin Laden called for Muslims everywhere to treat the latest “invasion” in the same way the Russians were treated. In addition, thousands of nomadic Pashtun militiatemen have crossed over the mountains from Pakistan to support the war efforts of their co-religionists.

All these groups espouse a very narrow version of Islam. We read recently of the closure of girls’ schools in part of the area controlled by the Taliban. The poignant symbolism of cutting young girls off from learning how to read or write is surely as close to cultural nihilism as you will find anywhere.

Back to the basic question regarding what the United States and its allies are trying to achieve in this chaotic country. Sure, we want to defeat Al Qaeda and capture or kill Bin Laden, but why should we be successful now when our best efforts have failed since 2002? Will 17 thousand – or ten times that number – help us to meet that goal? Or will additional Western soldiers stiffen Taliban resistance even more as increases in Russian troops did twenty years ago? Will confronting Islamic extremism with sophisticated American weaponry inevitably lead to more terrorist actions against the West?

Western bombers control the air, but bombing “targets” in mountain villages has the serious downside of increasing the level of anger and hatred against the “American invaders!” A senior Russian diplomat, Mr. Ragozin, was quoted recently as saying about the war in Afghanistan: “They have repeated our mistakes, and they have made a mountain of their own.”

Will the Karzai government be able to hold credible elections this year, despite the Taliban insurgency? Can any elected government in Kabul extend its remit over all of its territory? Do tens of thousands of foreign troops help or hinder their chances of success?

Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, said recently that the three D’s will guide US foreign policy all over the world – development, diplomacy and defense. Development funds are badly needed for education and health care in that area of the world, and behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts, especially in the Muslim world, to enhance the legitimacy of the Kabul government could be very helpful and productive.

Under the third “D,” I think that there is a strong argument for limiting American military involvement to training, equipping, and advising the Kabul government’s army. There is a real danger that Afghanistan could become Obama’s Vietnam, a quagmire that he is dragged into because he didn’t get out on time – an unwinable war, that will drain America’s weak treasury, against opponents who play by their own rules.